Fast Track Call Cab Pvt. Ltd. and Anr. v. ANI Technologies Pvt. Ltd., Case No. 6 and 74 of 2015

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There are certain cases in any area of jurisprudence in law, including competition law, which tend to make an individual mark of their own. This may be simply due to the parties involved, or because the cases involve seminal questions in law which would help clarify the legislation involved for future use, or because the ramifications (not necessarily negative) of the Final Order go beyond just the law involved, and into the arena of a change in the very economics or social structure of the system the case may question.

In my personal opinion, Fast Track Call Cab Pvt. Ltd. and Anr. v. ANI Technologies Pvt. Ltd., Case No. 6 and 74 of 2015 falls into this category and for all the reasons stated above.

My criticism of past Orders of the Commission through this Blog is well known, but this time, I must bring on record my appreciation. The Final Order is by no means perfect or maybe even completely legally sound in all aspects, but it does display not only the growing maturity of competition jurisprudence by the Commission, but also at least an attempt by the D.G. to not be content with a superficial investigation of relevant market dynamics.

Both Ola and Uber have already suffered enough regulatory troubles regards surge pricing and driver registration from various transport departments across the country, and though Ola has won this round, there will most probably be an Appeal. But the biggest fallout for Ola (and even Uber), which in my personal opinions has made it a pyrrhic victory, is that the D.G. and the Commission have extensively written about the below cost pricing strategies adopted by both companies. In fact, the D.G. has gone so far as to note that the significant market share of Ola or Uber has nothing to do with technological innovation but is rather the pure consequent of below cost pricing. Whether the companies like it or not, it is probable that both Ola and Uber will be prodded to bring down the revenue drain, not just by investors but also by competitors and various state departments as economically, a market providing services below cost can under no circumstances be considered an economically sound market, and creates potential avenues for future investigations by the Commission.

COLLECTIVE DOMINANCE BACK IN THE LIMELIGHT

An alternative argument which was raised by the Informants while objecting to the D.G. Report was that there is a possibility of two entities exercising dominance at the same time. The Informants claimed that the analysis of the D.G. pointed towards the presence of more than one dominant player in the relevant market. Furthermore, they submitted that the D.G. in its report had admitted the growth of both Ola and Uber was not the result of any technological innovation or efficiency but the result of a practice to charge substantially below the average variable cost. The Informants also quoted the observations of the Canadian Competition Tribunal in the Visa Mastercard Case, which noted that both MasterCard and Visa can individually possess market power in the relevant market. It was thus submitted that a conclusion of simultaneous dominance of Ola and Uber was not incompatible with the provisions of the Competition Act, 2002.

I have already on a number of occasions discussed Collective Dominance (See here, here and here) and how it is not presently recognised under the Act. The Commission’s reasoning is similar to what we have already propagated here and I have nothing new to add in this area.

However, for the fun of it, let us hypothetically presume that Collective Dominance was recognised under the Competition Act. Could Ola and Uber have been held liable for abuse of dominant conduct ?? I would submit the answer would still be a no.

Firstly, since the Uber investigation has been stayed by the Supreme Court, no finding or penalty could be imposed upon Uber. But beyond that, secondly and more importantly, is that Ola and Uber would never be able to breach the threshold for Collective Dominance under Competition Law, and to understand why one needs to look into the case of U.S.A. v. VISA Et al., 344 F.3d 229 (United States Court of Appeals, second Circuit.). Similar issues were raised against VISA and Mastercard. To summarise, the United States Department of Justice brought enforcement action against the two payment card networks and licensor of one payment card brand, alleging that governance duality between networks and networks’ exclusivity rules were agreements in restraint of trade in violation of Sherman Antitrust Act. Challenging the organizational structure of two of the nation’s four major payment card systems, the complaint charged that MasterCard and Visa U.S.A., which are organized as joint ventures owned by their member banking institutions,conspired to restrain trade in two ways: (1) By enacting rules permitting a member-owner of one to function as a director of the other (an arrangement the government described as “dual governance”) (Count I); and (2) by enacting and enforcing “exclusionary rules,” which prohibit their member banks from issuing American Express (“Amex”) or Discover cards (Count II).

The Court held that Visa U.S.A. and MasterCard violated the Sherman Antitrust Act by enforcing their respective versions of the exclusionary rule, barring their member banks from issuing Amex or Discover cards. The Court further held that Visa International, which owns the Visa brand, licenses it to Visa U.S.A., and exercises certain governance powers over Visa U.S.A., was liable for participating in Visa U.S.A.’s violation. Factually, it is important to note that a member of either the Visa U.S.A. or MasterCard network could also be a member of the other network. Thus a bank that was a member of Visa U.S.A.’s network and issued Visa cards could also be a member of the MasterCard network and issue MasterCard cards. On the other hand, both MasterCard and Visa U.S.A. had promulgated rules that prohibited their members from issuing American Express or Discover cards. Evidence was also cited that atleast three major U.S. issuer banks would have contracted with American Express to issue Amex cards in the United States but for the exclusionary rules.

In other words, in Visa Mastercard, there was active collusion between the two entities to limit market access to the other two competitors, whereas in the case of Ola and Uber, it is anything but !! Both companies are constantly at each other’s throats on pricing and volume of rides in the country. We are starting to see a cut back on the below cost pricing strategy, but only a continual market watch on the sector will help to gather enough data to understand the consequent effects, and it is too early to take a firm decision as of today. Since Ola and Uber have together effectively turned the market as one heavily based on network effects, strong competition and constant change in market share might be the norm between the two for some time to come.

POST SCRIPT: UBER IN INDIA

The Uber legal team would have been on their tenterhooks till this Order came out, and will be studying it closely (the investigation against Uber has been stayed due to questions of law regarding the powers of the erstwhile Competition Appellate Tribunal (COMPAT) and the matter is presently pending in the Supreme Court). The relevant market would obviously include Uber, and the D.G./Commission made a number of observations regarding the company, such as:

1. “…[i]n the first six months of 2015-16 (till September 2015), the D.G. noticed that while OP’s market share increased from marginally by 2% to 3%, Uber’s share increased at a faster rate i.e. by about 20%-22%.” [This is definitely due to a lower base rate.]

2. “It was further noted that from March 2015 onwards, Uber has maintained the second position. The D.G. also noted that from January to September 2015, Uber’s trip size registered growth of nearly 1200%, while OP’s growth has been about 63% during the same period.” [Same reason as above.]

3. “The D.G., thus, noted that backed by its marketing technology and logistics and financial support, Uber was able to successfully counter the pricing strategy of OP, and being able to sustain losses, which restrained OP from exercising market power in the relevant market. This was evident from the fact that similar strategy was followed by Uber and as a result, the gap in market share between OP and Uber narrowed down from 69% in January 2015 to 22% by September 2015.”

4. “Further, with the steady increase in Uber’s market share from 6 – 7% in January 2015 to 36-37% in September 2015, it could not be said whether OP would be in a position to hold on to its market share for a sustainable period for assessment of dominance in the relevant market.”

5. “Thus, D.G. opined that both OP and Uber have adopted ‘below-cost pricing strategy’. However, since the scheme of the Act only attracts the provisions of Section 4 when an incumbent is found to be dominant, the D.G. stated that OP can be said to have
indulged in abuse by way of predatory pricing, only if it is found to be dominant in the relevant market. Since OP was not found to be dominant, the D.G. concluded that OP did not contravene the provisions of Section 4 of the Act.” [Emphasis added]

6. “On the other hand, Uber, which entered the relevant market in 2013-14, expanded its network rapidly to account for nearly one third of the active fleet in the relevant market in 2015-16. In terms of annual number of trips, its share increased from 1 – 2% in 2013-14 to 30-31% in 2015-16.”

7. “…[U]ber, entered the relevant market in the year 2013 and garnered a sizeable market share in just about two years’ time. In terms of number of trips on monthly basis, its share increased from 0-1% in August 2013 to 36-37% in September 2015. Further, Uber showed a steady growth February 2015 onwards, with its share in terms of monthly number of trips having increased from 6-7 % in January 2015 to 36-37% by September 2015. Its entry as well as steady growth during the period of investigation shows that the market was evolving. While Uber’s entry, as the Informant has argued, did not dislodge OP during the period of investigation, OP’s declining market share post January 2015 reflects the competitive constraint posed by Uber and the fragility of leadership position in a dynamic business environment, as discussed earlier.”

8. “As a matter of record, in the present case, OP does not have an edge over all its competitors in terms of the size and resources. Interestingly, the investigation revealed that that Uber Inc., which is the parent company for Uber had a total capital investment of about 15 to 20 times of OP’s financial resources.” [The C.C.I. doesn’t seem to have made much of this, but it is important to note that “size and resources of the enterprise” and “economic power of the enterprise including commercial advantages over competitors” are two of the factors to be taken into consideration during an inquiry under Section 19(4)(b) and Section 19(4)(d) of the Act respectively.]

All this goes to show that Ola may owe Uber one for its victory, and also that Uber will be fully focused to ensure a favourable outcome in the Supreme Court to avoid the cross hairs of the D.G./C.C.I.

C.C.I./T.R.A.I. and Flashbacks to Old Posts

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The recent C.C.I. – T.R.A.I. jurisdiction conflict regarding tariff investigations reminded of an old post which was written a long time ago. Those were very early days for the Competition Act and the C.C.I., but a theoretical conflict was spoken off even then. Personally, I find it surprising that it took so long for a dispute between the two to come to the fore, but without a doubt, sooner or later, it was bound to rear its head.

The old posts can be found here and here. I have nothing more to add, except factually, the C.C.I. appears to have failed to hold its own in Court when it’s jurisdiction came to be challenged regards the C.E.R.C. and the P.N.G.R.B. The P.N.G.R.B. Case was pending even at the time the previous posts were written, but subsequently fell below the radar. Surprisingly, neither of the Judgements (the C.E.R.C. Case or the P.N.G.R.B. Case) can be found. Please do post a link in the comments in case you find them or have access to them.

Indian Merger Control – 30 Days Sword Gone (And an Introduction :-))

Allow us to introduce Ms. Samali Verma, who will now join us on this Blog. She is presently pursuing a Judicial Clerkship at the High Court of Delhi and has extensive experience on the subject of our love prior to her present role. She plans to start with small snippets/updates and we soon hope to see larger posts from her over time. Welcome to the Blog, Samali. 🙂

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In a significant development, the Ministry of Corporate affairs vide its notification dated 29.06.2017 has brought in a relaxation with respect to the time-period within which a merger/combination transaction is to be notified to the Competition Commission of India (C.C.I.).

This notification exempts an enterprise, from filing a notice within 30 days, for a period of five years from the date of the notification. The C.C.I. has now effectively done away with the earlier mandate which required filling within 30 days of a trigger event.

This is a much appreciated relaxation in the merger control regime in India. This change was long due, and now this finally puts India at par with the internationally accepted best practices in the merger control regime. It is expected to further increase the ease of doing business in India and is a welcome step, especially for those involved in multi-jurisdictional filings, as this removes the artificial pressure of having to comply with the 30 day deadline. The failure to give notice to the C.C.I. of a notifiable transaction may attract penalty, which may extend to one percent of the total turnover or assets of the combination.

Click here for a copy of the Notification.

M/s. Crown Theatre v. Kerala Film Exhibitors Federation (KFEF), Case No. 16 of 2014 (Decided on 08.09.2015)

The case of M/s. Crown Theatre v. Kerala Film Exhibitors Federation (KFEF), Case No. 16 of 2014 (Decided on 08.09.2015) is another case of the C.C.I. which is probably going to get added to the list of cases which is receiving criticism from the COMPAT in Appeal. Not necessarily on the merits of the case but more so on procedure. After all, the K.F.E.F. is a serial competition law violator and has been found to be guilty of the violation of competition law and fined multiple times before (In fact, even the individuals penalised are the same). The problem is with the way fines are being calculated in this particular case.

Shockingly, the fine, which was supposed to be ten percent of the average turnover of the past three years (Financial years 2011 – 2012, 2012 – 2013, 2013 – 2014) has been calculated only on the basis of the turnover of 2011 – 2012. Section 27 clearly mandates that it must be calculated on the turnover of the last three years. It is not optional for the C.C.I. to calculate it without taking into account one or more financial years. Also, the only explanation which has been provided in the table is “not submitted”, which, while understandable, is not a good enough excuse for the non calculation of any statutory penalty as per the law for which a clear formula has been provided under the Act.

Now as per procedure, the C.C.I. always calls for the financial statements of the past three years without prejudice to the merits of the case of the Respondents, so that in the event they are found guilty, the fine, if any, can be calculated. It is possible that the Respondents herein did not comply with the Order of the Commission and intentionally avoided the submission of the statements before the Commission. Thus, a perfect case for the Commission to exercise powers under Section 43 (or Section 45, as the case may be) under the Act. If there is a genuine and reasonable reason for this omission, then the Commission should have clearly stated the same in the Order.

Either way, it gives the COMPAT a clear cut reason to remand he matter back for reconsideration on the issue of penalty, just like it did in the Gas Cylinder Bid Rigging Case.

Director’s Brought Under The C.C.I. Scanner

The post below is by Kritika Sethi, a 4th year B.A. LLB. (Hons.) Student at NALSAR, Hyderabad. In it, she examines the Director’s Fiduciary competition law liability in light of the recent C.O.M.P.A.T. Order in National Stock Exchange v C.C.I., Appeal No. 15 of 2011.

The Competition Appellate Tribunal (C.O.M.P.A.T.) in its recent Order dated 05.08.2014 in the case of National Stock Exchange v C.C.I., Appeal No. 15 of 2011, has upheld the Order of the C.C.I. in MCX Stock Exchange Limited v. National Stock Exchange of India Ltd., Case No. 13 of 2009 [Majority Order, Dissenting Order, Section 38 Order] in holding the Company liable for abuse of its dominant position in the currency derivative business segment.

The case arose out of an information which was filed by the MCX Stock Exchange (“MCX”) against National Stock Exchange of India Ltd.(“NSE”) wherein it was alleged by the former that the latter has abused its dominant position in the Currency Derivatives (“CD”) segment. CD was introduced in accordance with the recommendations of R.B.I. and S.E.B.I. in August 2008. NSE had started its operation in the CD segment from that month itself. Further, vide its circular dated 26.08.2008, it had announced a waiver of transaction fee in all the currency future trade which included the CD segment. This waiver was extended from time to time. This extension was in operation when Section 4 of the Competition Act, 2002 was notified in 2009. MCX and NSE were the only active players that dealt in the currency derivatives market. The former operated in the CD segment only. It was not given the license to operate in any other segment like Stock Futures and Options, etc. On account of the waiver of the transaction fees and other associated charges in the CD segment by NSE, MCX was forced to waive various charges as well. It could not levy any other charge for income generation such as, inter alia, annuals subscription fees, and advance minimum transaction fees. By virtue of this waiver, it suffered huge losses. Further, NSE was charging annual subscription fees in the other segments, where MCX didn’t have a license to operate. Therefore, it was alleged by the MCX that this had a potential of removal of the only competitor and any potential competitor in the CD market due to its non-profitability.

NSE was held to be a dominant player in the market on account of its resources, size, higher degree of vertical integration, power in the market, absolute dependence of consumers etc. NSE had a higher market share than MCX and was financially stable and sufficiently resourceful to survive in the market despite waiver of any transaction charges, which was not the case with MCX.

The point to be appreciated is that the additional fiduciary duty which has been imposed on the director’s of the Company to be cautious in not violating the Competition Act, 2002. The Companies Act, 1956 did not codify the myriad of duties of the director’s of a Company and so the Courts had to rely upon common law in order to cast any duty on the directors. The Companies Act, 2013, on the other hand, recently codified various duties of a director of a Company under Section 166 of the Act. It provides for two kinds of duties i.e. duty of care, skill and diligence and fiduciary duties. One recent addition is the ‘fiduciary antitrust duty’ pursuant to which, if the company is in a dominant position in the market, the directors have a duty to take precautions so as to not to abuse the same. The Competition Act, under Section 4, does not proscribe enjoyment of a dominant position by an enterprise in the market. It is its abuse which is penalised under the Act.

The Tribunal opined that NSE must have known about the “activation” of Section 4. The Tribunal was “perplexed” when, after going through the minutes of the Pricing Meeting of the company, there was no mention of Section 4 being taken into consideration while deliberating on whether to extend the fee waiver on March 30, 2009 till June 2009; whereas the section was notified on 20 May 2009. The tribunal had expected NSE to take note of the activation of Section 4 of the Act as and when it was notified.

This ruling can have an immense impact on other companies which are assumed to be aware of their dominant position in the market. Its impact on cases brought up in the future will have to be analysed to fathom the scope of such a duty.

The penalty imposed on NSE by the CCI (and as upheld by the COMPAT), has been stayed by the Supreme Court by its Order on Sept 23, 2014.

Invitation for Applications for Vacant “Member” Posts.

The C.C.I. has invited Applications for filling up of the two vacant “Member” positions in the Commission. How meritorious the selection will be remains to be seen, as such positions are often prone to bureaucratic and judicial lobbying. Nevertheless, one must learn to retain faith in the system, for if we can’t, then we might as well live in Hobbes’ anarchic world where are lives would be “Solitary, Poor, Nasty, Brutish and Short.” [Have just finished “Law’s Empire” by Ronald Dworkin (finally, if I might add !!), which coupled with the Gopal Subramanium Fracas has put me in a sadly philosophical mood.]

Last date for Submitting Applications is 24th July, 2014.

Further details can be found here.

Anonymous v. Bengal Greenfield Housing Dev. Co. Ltd And Others, Case No. 103/2013

This is one case which has surprisingly been closed by the Commission, with the finding that that no case has been made out of the existence of an Anti-Competitive Agreement or of an Abuse of Dominant Position. However, in my humble opinion, I am not so sure. While the conclusion of the D.G. in the end may have been that there was no Competition Law violation, it was definitely a case which merited a reference to the D.G. for further investigation.

The Informant in the present case claimed that the absorption of new supply of flats despite prices having gone up from Rs. 1,100/- to 4,800/- per square feet and the sale of Application Forms and allotment through lottery suggesting huge demand gave a clear impression of manipulation and restriction of supply and use of monopolistic and dominant status for monopolistic pricing as the the parcel of land for the township was being developed selectively despite the final allotment of land to the respective builders.

The reason the case is so important is because the Commission seems to have not given enough consideration, though it has been mentioned in the Order of the Commission, is that all the Respondents/Opposite Parties except for DLF Universal Ltd., are in fact joint ventures between the West Bengal Housing Board and various individual private entities. Therefore, all the entities have a common partner which definitely gives an impression of the various Respondents possessing the capability to effectively communicate with each other, or at the very least, coordinating with each other per force the directive of the W.B.H.B. Granted, it is a government body which claims as it’s objective to provide affordable housing to the people of West Bengal. But as we all already know, Government Bodies are not innocent when it comes to violation of Competition Law.

In my humble opinion, there exists a prima-facie case to be investigated on the violation of Section 3(3)(a) and Section 3(3)(b) of the Act and to be frank, it is unfortunate that the Commission chose to close the case.