Analysis of The Competition (Amendment) Bill, 2012 [Part – 2]

The previous post on the Competition Amendment Bill, 2012 discussed amendments upto Section 9. Continuing therefrom, is as follows:

6. Amendment to Section 20 and Section 21 and Section 21A

In Section 20 of the Act, in sub-section (2), the words “or reference” are to be omitted. Whereas, in Section 21, in sub-section (1), for the words “is raised by any party” and  “authority may”, the words “arises” and “authority shall” are to be substituted respectively. Furthermore, the proviso is also to be deleted.

While the amendment to Section 20(2) merely fixes a clerical error, the amendments to Section 21 are important as the intention is without a doubt to try and bridge the differences which have arisen between the CCI and various other regulatory bodies on jurisdictional conflicts between them (For previous posts on this issue, see here, here and here). Similarly, the amendments to Section 21A will ensure that the sector specific regulatory bodies do not feel left out by putting a vice – versa obligation upon the CCI as well.

While the amendment puts a compulsion on any sector specific regulatory body to refer a competition matter to the Commission (which is good), it however, does not clarify as to who exactly decides if a competition related issue has arisen. It does not clarify whether the CCI or the regulatory body is to be the final arbiter of this question and this does tend to encourage ambiguity and this will without a doubt be submitted as a preliminary objection by lawyers in such disputes. However, once can assume that the term “arises” would refer to any violation of the provisions of the Competition Act.

7. Amendment to Section 26

This is again a clarificatory amendment on the Commissions power to refer the matter back to the Director General for further investigation by inserting the line “and make appropriate orders thereon after hearing the concerned parties” after each Sub-Section.

8. Amendment to Section 27

There are two amendments proposed in Section 27

(i) In clause (b), after the proviso, the following proviso shall be inserted:

“Provided further that no such penalty shall be imposed by the Commission
under this section without giving an opportunity of being heard to the producer,
seller, distributor, trader or service provider, as the case may be.”

(ii) In clause (g), after the proviso, the following proviso shall be inserted:

“Provided further that while passing orders under this section, the
Commission shall give due regard to the opinion given by the statutory authority,
where such opinion has been obtained under the provisions of sub-section (1)
of section 21A of this Act.”.

These additions into Section 27 do not seem to serve any useful purpose. The first proviso to be inserted provides an unnecessary extra procedural hurdle whereas the latter proviso was not really needed considering the Commission would anyways have to do the same under Section 21A. However, since it does not seem capable of causing any foreseeable harm in the future, so be it.

9. Amendment to Section 31

The Amendment to Section 31(11) seeks to reduce the statutory time available to the Commission to decide on notices of Combinations from two hundred and ten days to one hundred and eighty days. At the same time, the Amendment to Section 31(12) allows the parties to the Combination to apply for another one hundred and eighty days to comply with the Commissions Order/modifications from the previous period of upto ninety days. While these amendments are welcome, they will not be able to deliver the desired effect unless the Commission is adequately staffed. From what one has heard through the grapevine, the CCI is still grappling with recruitment problems for various vacant posts.

10. Amendment to Section 41

This is by far the most important amendment proposed to the Act. It aims to ensure the Commission of full and effective control by conferring the authority on the Commission to grant powers of search and seizure to the Director General’s office as and when required. this is similar to powers given to U.S. and E.U. competition authorities and will go a long way in effectively enforcing the Act. While such sweeping preeminent powers have been much criticised in the E.U. (especially in the case of dawn raids), I feel the puzzle pieces shall overtime fall into place with the help of judicial interpretation and CCI regulations.

11. Amendments to Section 43, Section 51, Section 53A and Section 63

A few small clarificatory and clerical amendments have also been proposed:

In section 43 of the principal Act, for the words “punishable with fine”, the words “liable to a penalty” are proposed to be substituted.

In section 51 of the principal Act, in sub-section (2), in clause (a), for the words “the Registrar”, the words “the Secretary” shall be substituted.

In section 53A of the principal Act, in sub-section (1), in clause (a), for the words, brackets and figures “sub-sections (2) and (6)”, the words, brackets and figures “sub-sections (2), (6), (7) and (8)” shall be substituted. This has probably been proposed in response to arguments raised in Singhania & Partners LLP v. Microsoft Corporation and Jindal Steel & Power Ltd. vs Steel Authority of India Ltd. [Attached our the main Orders of the Commission. Please visit the COMPAT website for the Tribunal Orders on the Appeals, where such grounds were raised.]

In section 63 of the principal Act, in sub-section (3), after the words “Every notification issued under”, the word, figure and letter “section 5A”, shall be inserted.

CONCLUSION

Overall, its a good bill, and in all probability the treasury benches shall face little opposition on it. the real question is when it will come up for vote and be passed. In the meantime, here’s hoping for a better competition regime in the Country soon.

P.S.: If I had to rate the Bill, I would give it a 7/10. Please do reply with with your thoughts on how you would rate the Bill in the comments sections below.

Analysis of The Competition (Amendment) Bill, 2012 [Part – 1]

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The Government on 10th December finally introduced the much awaited (and speculated upon, considering the number of pieces I read in the Economic Times on it) Competition Amendment Bill, 2012.  Obviously, we have been looking forward to write a post on the Bill (and i’m sure the readers have been waiting as well). So, hereunder, is a detailed analysis of the Competition Amendment Bill, 2012.:

1.  Amendment of Section 2

Section 2(y) defines the term “Turnover” . In it, as per the Bill, after the words “goods or services”, the words “excluding the taxes, if any, levied on sale of such goods or provision of services” are to be inserted. This amendment does help to provide a clarification on the turnover threshold for combinations.  However, what is also important is to note that it also reduces the quantum of penalty which can be levied by the Commission under Section 27 of the Act, which relies heavily on this term to ascertain the quantity to be levied. Personally, I do not consider this to be irrelevant as considering the intention of the Competition Act is to take punitive action against violators of the provision of the Act, any amendment whose consequence is to reduce the punitive burden on the violator in case of contravention is not suitable in the long term interest of enforcement of the Act. Some may choose to disagree, but I have always been a firm believer that competition law violators need to be hit hard where it hurts the most (their wallets) in order  to ensure the desired effect.

2. Amendment to Section 3

Section3(4) enumerating the definitions of various vertical restraints to appropriately include “services” wherever necessary. I had noticed this lacunae during my early readings of the Act around two years ago, and in fact, the restrictive definition was also a contention in a moot court competition. While my argument was rejected then, it is nice to find one’s stand partially vindicated. 🙂

3. Amendment to Section 4

In section 4(1), after the words “or group”, the words “jointly or singly” are to be inserted. This will help in enforcing the concept of “collective dominance” under competition law as recognised in the EU and shall provide some much needed clarification on the interpretation of the Act. (See here for one of my previous posts which partially discusses this issue)

4.  Section 5 and the new Section 5A

firstly, just to clarify, the amendment to Section 4 shall ensure that the Commission does not need to rely on the definition of “Group” under Section 5, which may have caused some confusion since the purpose of that definition is to aid Section 5 exclusively. Moving on, in the Explanation, in clause (b), in sub-clause (i), for the words “twenty-six per cent.”, the words “fifty per cent.” shall be substituted as per the bill. It narrows the definition slightly, but it probably will not have a significant impact on it. What is more relevant is the insertion of a new Section 5A which states as follows:

“5A. Notwithstanding anything in section 5, the Central Government may, in
consultation with the Commission, by notification, specify different value of assets
and turnover for any class or classes of enterprise for the purpose of section 5.”.

The insertion of this new section is primarily intended to supplement the power of the Central Government under Sections 54, 55 and 56 of the Act.

5. Amendment to Section 9.

This is a needless Amendment. In intends to formulate two different procedures for the selection of the Chairperson and the other members of the Commission respectively. this would have made sense if the intention of the Government is to try and circumvent the delay which is often accompanied in the appointment of various Tribunal and Regulatory heads by ensuring that the Commission continues to function. However, such a purpose will not be fulfilled by this amendment since the amendment requires that the Selection Committee first recommend the names, which basically brings everybody back to square one !!

(TO BE CONTD.)

Ajay Devgan v. Yash Raj | This movie has Action, Romance And Monoplistic Practice

Here is my latest post on the India Law and Technology Blog on the Ajay Devgan Films v. Yash Raj Films Order.

Click here to view the post.

P.S.: Also find here Volume 2 of “Fair Play”, the quarterly newsletter of the CCI.

Supporting And Growing Our Premise

In our post titled “Executive Actions And Indian Competition Law:A Premise”, we tried to develop a premise on when the executive actions may be considered anti-competitive under the Competition Act. In an attempt to grow on that post, a recent article in Mint titled “Ending India’s Food Cartels helps us to further stress on the point in the above post. The article focuses on the monopoly of the Food Corporation of India (FCI) and the Agricultural Produce Marketing Committees (APMC’s).

While I do not entirely agree with the article ( APMC’s cannot be considered for anti-competitive practices, the reasons for which please read the previous posts and “hoarding” by the FCI is forgetting the fact that the FCI is also the organisation to manage the buffer stocks of the country), I do feel there may be a case against the FCI with regards some of its procurement policies. However, only a detailed in-dept investigation can reveal more.

Cabinet Approves Amendments To the Competition Act, 2002

As per a press release by the Ministry of Corporate Affairs,

“The Union Cabinet has approved the proposal of the Ministry of Corporate Affairs to further amend the Competition Act, 2002, with a view to fine tune it and to meet the present day needs in the field of competition, in the light of the experiences gained in the actual working of the Competition Commission of India in the last few years.”

Unfortunately, we could not find a draft of the Amendment Bill on the Ministry’s website. Will write a detailed piece on the same as soon as it is made public. In the meantime, if anybody finds the draft, please post the link to the same in the comments below.

Good Intentions Do Not Imply Good Actions

It has been recently reported that the Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (CERC) has issued draft regulations intended to prevent abuse of market power and regulate the conduct of companies harming or potentially harming competition in the sector.

As per the news article:

“The proposals allow it to issue directions in the event of anti-competitive agreements, abuse of dominant position or anti-competitive combinations entered into by any entity, licensee, deemed licensee and licence-exempt ones.”

While am sure that the intentions of the CERC are good and their initiative may be applauded in terms of pro-activity, it doesn’t exactly help in settling the jurisdictional conflicts between the CCI and various other sectoral regulators, many of whom have been lobbying to prevent loss of turf.  In fact, a bare perusal of the draft shows that the CERC is merely empowering itself with the powers already enumerated for the CCI under the Competition Act. It grants itself the power to investigate anti-competitive agreements, abuses of dominant positions and even combinations related to the power sector !! The only rider is under the proviso to Regulation 8(1) and Regulation 8(2) of the draft which are as follows respectively:

“…Provided that a complaint under sub-regulation (a) or a reference under subregulation (b) shall be accompanied by an affidavit stating that the Competition Commission of India is not inquiring into the matter referred to in the said complaint or the said reference.”

“If during the course of the said inquiry or any subsequent proceedings, it comes to the notice of the Central Commission that the matter under its consideration is also being inquired into by the Competition Commission of India, the Central Commission may refer the matter to the Competition Commission of India as provided in regulation 12 or may seek the opinion of the Competition Commission of India as provided in Regulation 13.”

Click on the following links for the regulations. (Public Notice/ Explanatory Memorandum/ Draft)

Executive Actions and Indian Competition Law: A Premise

In one of our previous posts, I had tried to highlight that a regulatory authority of the government could not in most cases be challenged as anti-competitive or an abuse of dominant position. Using the facts of that particular case, I had tried to show that in most cases such authority of a ministry or a sub-division of the ministry could not be challenged.

To grow upon that post, I submit the Commissions order in Arshiya Rail Infrastructure Ltd. (ARIL) vs Ministry of Railway (MoR) & Ors.  (Main Order/Per S.N. Dhingra, Member/Per M.L. Tayal, Member/Per R. Prasad, Member (Dissenting)) is one of the few cases where executive actions could be challenged as anti-competitive. While once again the Commission dismissed the case on merits, the Order helps in clarifying the Commissions stand regarding this issue and consequently, also helps us to update our previous premise to as follows:

1.   Exercise of executive authority through regulations or rules issued by an executive authority for the purposes of regulation of the provision of any goods or service cannot by itself be considered a service on the part of the Government.  It is merely the exercise of the legitimate state authority, and thus cannot be challenged as anti-competitive or an abuse of dominant position.

2. Any action of such a government authority when  a subdivision of that ministry or authority ( in this case, the Indian Railways) wherein the ministry or executive authority’s position results in a DIRECT relation as a competitor in the relevant market may be challenged as anti-competitive or an abuse of dominant position as the ministry or its sub-division would end up coming under the ambit of the definition of “enterprise” under Section 2(h) of the Act and thus could also be interpreted under the definition of “group” as given under clause (b) in the Explanation to Section 5.

We welcome your comments, criticism and feedback on the above premise.

CCI’s Limits

A small issue in the recent Order of the Commission in Saurabh Bhargava v. Ministry of Agriculture (Main Order/Dissenting) was whether the Commission had the authority to issue a notice to the Ministry of Agriculture or even reprimand it for any laws which it may enact which may be considered ‘anti-competitive’ in the relevant market economy. The main order does not bother to stress on the issue (presumably because the case as it is stands dismissed on merits). However, it is respectfully submitted that the CCI would not have any statutory authority for the following reasons.:

1. The definition of enterprise has been defined under Section 2(h) as follows:

“enterprise” means a person or a department of the Government, who or which is, or has been, engaged in any activity, relating to the production, storage, supply, distribution, acquisition or control of articles or goods, or the provision of services, of any kind, or in investment, or in the business
of acquiring, holding, underwriting or dealing with shares, debentures or other securities of any other body corporate, either directly or through one or more of its units or divisions or subsidiaries, whether such unit or division or subsidiary is located at the same place where the enterprise is
located or at a different place or at different places, but does not include any activity of the Government relatable to the sovereign functions of the Government including all activities carried on by the departments of the Central Government dealing with atomic energy, currency, defence and space.

Now firstly, regulations or rules issued by any executive authority for the purposes of regulation of the provision of any goods or service cannot be it self be considered a service on the part of the Government.  It is merely the exercise of the legitimate state authority. Secondly, using the phrase “..relating to the….” to justify such sanction of such executive authority is I feel too broad an interpretation of the definition of the term “enterprise”.

2. Section 3 is irrelevant in such cases as the Government does not enter into an agreement of any form in stipulating certain regulatory criteria which requires fulfillment by an individual to commence his or her operations.

3. An argument against the government under Section 4 would also fail in light of the definition of the term “Dominant Position” under the explanation to Section 4.:

(a) “dominant position” means a position of strength, enjoyed by an enterprise, in the relevant market, in India, which enables it to—
(i) operate independently of competitive forces prevailing in the relevant market; or
(ii) affect its competitors or consumers or the relevant market in its favour.

The dual requirements of this definition cannot be fulfilled since any such ministry or other governmental department is not part of any relevant market or catering to any consumers with any goods or services.

4. A notification under Section 54 would also not be necessary in such a circumstance for the reasons mentioned above.

However, I should clarify that I certainly do not intend to say that a PSU cannot be held accountable under the Act. The above argument would apply strictly to an executive authority of the government such as a ministry or a sub-division of a ministry.