Here is my latest post on the India Law and Technology Blog on the Ajay Devgan Films v. Yash Raj Films Order.
Click here to view the post.
P.S.: Also find here Volume 2 of “Fair Play”, the quarterly newsletter of the CCI.
Here is my latest post on the India Law and Technology Blog on the Ajay Devgan Films v. Yash Raj Films Order.
Click here to view the post.
P.S.: Also find here Volume 2 of “Fair Play”, the quarterly newsletter of the CCI.
It has been recently reported that the Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (CERC) has issued draft regulations intended to prevent abuse of market power and regulate the conduct of companies harming or potentially harming competition in the sector.
As per the news article:
“The proposals allow it to issue directions in the event of anti-competitive agreements, abuse of dominant position or anti-competitive combinations entered into by any entity, licensee, deemed licensee and licence-exempt ones.”
While am sure that the intentions of the CERC are good and their initiative may be applauded in terms of pro-activity, it doesn’t exactly help in settling the jurisdictional conflicts between the CCI and various other sectoral regulators, many of whom have been lobbying to prevent loss of turf. In fact, a bare perusal of the draft shows that the CERC is merely empowering itself with the powers already enumerated for the CCI under the Competition Act. It grants itself the power to investigate anti-competitive agreements, abuses of dominant positions and even combinations related to the power sector !! The only rider is under the proviso to Regulation 8(1) and Regulation 8(2) of the draft which are as follows respectively:
“…Provided that a complaint under sub-regulation (a) or a reference under subregulation (b) shall be accompanied by an affidavit stating that the Competition Commission of India is not inquiring into the matter referred to in the said complaint or the said reference.”
“If during the course of the said inquiry or any subsequent proceedings, it comes to the notice of the Central Commission that the matter under its consideration is also being inquired into by the Competition Commission of India, the Central Commission may refer the matter to the Competition Commission of India as provided in regulation 12 or may seek the opinion of the Competition Commission of India as provided in Regulation 13.”
Click on the following links for the regulations. (Public Notice/ Explanatory Memorandum/ Draft)
The Competition Appellate Tribunal (COMPAT) has admitted the appeal of the Consumer Online Foundation (COF) against the decision of the CCI clearing DTH operators including Tata Sky and Reliance Big TV of charges of market dominance abuse in the set-top boxes case has been challenged by a consumer r
ights group. The matter has been listed for September 5th.
The appeal is not surprising. I have already expressed my views on the apparent confusion of the CCI in the relevant matter on the India Law and Technology Blog.
The CCI in its recent Order dated 4th July, 2012 in the case of Owners and Occupants Welfare Association v. M/s DLF Commercial Developers Ltd. (Main Order/Separate Order/Dissenting Order) dismissed the complaint of the informant on the grounds and to quote:
“It is not alleged by applicant that Jasola District Centre had some particular significance to the allottees in comparison to other commercial space located in Delhi. The allottees who booked commercial space in Jasola could have booked commercial space anywhere in Delhi. The informant has not stated about the purpose of investment made by the allottees, whether the allottees had booked for the purpose of shifting their existing business in the nearby areas or they had booked for the purpose of investment.”
Granted, the first point is relevant. The issue at hand is the second point. On the second reason, the Commission has taken the logic that the booking of commercial space is done by two types of consumers. The first category are those are in the need of commercial space for the purpose of establishing a new business venture or for shifting their business place from one place to another place. The second category comprises of who invest in the commercial space for purpose of profits or future rental income.
No doubt such a category of consumers does exist but the question is exactly why such a distinction would be relevant in the present matter. Firstly, any such group of consumers, irrespective of their intentions, would without a doubt still be affected by any such abusive practices of DLF. Secondly, the argument of substitutability also may be hard to support in the present matter due to firstly that such investor would also take into account the fact that “Jasola being far away from the existing commercial centers, there was no nearby commercial complex within few hundred meters at the time when Jasola started developing.” For such investors, substitutability often stands reduced as a new commercial center would mean being able to buy a space for a better price than available in a developed area, and therefore, better profits from the rent revenue, especially in the long run. It must also be noted that any such consumer/buyer considers such an acquisition as a long term investment where the returns or profits shall only be recuperated with time.
Moreover, in conclusion, assuming (as this has not been confirmed in the order) that the consumers/buyers in this case have become “captive consumers” (as was the case in the previous DLF Order of the CCI), then such substitutability cannot be effectively measured. (This is one of the faults which I find in the use of the SSNIP Test, but more on this later).
I recently wrote a post titled “A Few Thoughts on Competition Law in the Technology and Media Sector” for the India Law and technology Blog. To read the article, please click here.
And others shall bite the dust !! What with the CCI initiating suo moto investigation against milk retailers, not to mention, to quote Mr. Chawla, Chairman of CCI
“Real estate, pharmaceuticals, aviation, telecom and tyre industries are on our radar. The inquiry against tyre companies is in an advanced stage and a decision can be expected soon”
The CCI has a busy monsoon ahead !! However, the intention of this post is to specifically focus on the investigation by the DG against automobile companies. Assuming the facts in the article are true, and please note, the opinion is based strictly on the article’s contents, the odds seem to be heavily stacked against the respondents. Such agreements are unanimously considered as anti-competitive throughout all jurisdictions (See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Svcs., 504 US 451 (1992) and Standard Oil Co. of California v. United States337 US 293 (1949) ). Also, see COMMISSION REGULATION (EU) No 461/2010 of 27 May 2010 on the application of Article 101(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to categories of vertical agreements and concerted practices in the motor vehicle sector.
Closer to home, Both the cases of Tata Engineering & Locomotive Co. Ltd. v. Registrar of Restrictive Trade Practices, [1977] 2 SCR 685 and Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd vs Union Of India & Anr, 1979 SCR (2)1038 dealt with a similar issue.
The analogy might seem stupid or funny to many, but I just couldn’t help but remember the movie Batman Begins while reading the news about the CCI’s Cement Cartel Decision. Think about it, just like the Batman, there are now those who love the CCI, proud that someone decided to teach the big corporations a lesson, and there are those who hate the CCI, who are not only crying themselves hoarse on the injustice meted out to the Cement Manufacturers’ Association (CMA) and its affiliated companies and who will surely appeal to the COMPAT, and if required, even the Supreme Court.
While I do support the decision (a day may come when I shall become Anti- CCI, but it is not today and shall probably not come for quite some time), there are a few questions or points which do merit consideration, just for the sake of clarification, if nothing else. They are as follows:
1. Almost all the companies as respondents have contended that there profits actually fell for the period in consideration, and hence, no benefit actually accrued to the companies who were allegedly members of the cartel. Even assuming that this is true, the argument is irrelevant under competition law. The U.S. Supreme Court held as far back as 1927 in United States v. Trenton Potteries Co. et. al., 273 US 392 (1927) that
“the aim and he aim and result of every price-fixing agreement, if effective, is the elimination of one form of competition. The power to fix prices, whether reasonably exercised or not, involves power to control the market and to fix arbitrary and unreasonable prices….Once established, it may be maintained unchanged because of the absence of competition secured by the agreement for a price reasonable when fixed. Agreements which create such potential power may well be held to be, in themselves, unreasonable or unlawful restraints without the necessity of minute inquiry whether a particular price is reasonable or unreasonable as fixed and without placing on the government”
The decision was further affirmed in United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 US 150 (1940) wherein it was observed
“Any combination which tampers with price structures is engaged in an unlawful activity. Even though the members of the price-fixing group were in no position to control the market, to the extent that they raised, lowered, or stabilized prices, they would be directly interfering with the free play of market forces.”
2. Circumstantial Evidence also seems to have become a bone of contention with every respondent contending that the circumstantial evidence is not good enough to prove a cartel. This IS a contentious issue since the use of circumstantial evidence in competition law is as of now debatable. I would prefer to let the OECD do the talking on this subject, through their excellent policy roundtable paper on the same. The key point to note is that their primarily two forms of circumstantial evidence, communication evidence and economic evidence. Of the two, communication evidence is considered to be the more important as economic evidence is often ambiguous due to the multiple interpretations available for the same. This is more than evident in the Order itself, wherein a number of respondents have relied on the affidavits and expert opinion of economic experts to substantiate their case. ( One sees to get the impression that all of them have their own opinion regarding the same !! 😀 Also, pages 156 and 157 of the Order speak on the Commissions decision of circumstantial evidence).
3. There is a prickly issue in the claim that the collection of the information was asked by the government itself, and that after the closure of the Office of Development Commissioner of Cement Industry (DCCI) in 1989, the CMA was directed by the Department of Industrial policy and Promotion to collect and submit data which was earlier collected by the DCCI. Now Section 54 clearly allows the Central Government, by notification to exempt any enterprise or class of enterprises from the provisions of the Act where that enterprise performs a sovereign function on behalf of the Central Government. Also, in case an enterprise is engaged in any activity including the activity relatable to the sovereign functions of the Government, the Central Government may grant exemption only in respect of activity relatable to the sovereign functions. The collection of such information by the CMA for the Ministry of Commerce can be interpreted as the performance of the sovereign function for the Central Government. The catch: I could not find any notification issued by the Central Government published in the Gazette which grants such an exemption to the CMA. If the respondents possess one, then good for them. It will be a very strong argument before the COMPAT.
4. I don’t see the relevant market issue ( See pages 184 and 233 of the Order) as a serious problem as long the evidence points to a general collusion. However, only further proceedings before the COMPAT help us understand this issue better.
Joaquín Almunia, Vice President of the European Commission responsible for Competition Policy on 21st May released a statement on the Google investigation. (Agree this is a rather late update. Unfortunately, missed it due to examinations).
In it, he has highlighted four concerns against Google which are as follows
First, in its general search results on the web, Google displays links to its own vertical search services. Also, Google displays links to its own vertical search services differently than it does for links to competitors.The Concerns of the EC are that this may result in preferential treatment compared to those of competing services, which may be hurt as a consequence.
Second, concerns related to the way Google copies content from competing vertical search services and uses it in its own offerings. Google may be copying original material from the websites of its competitors such as user reviews and using that material on its own sites without their prior authorisation. In this way they are appropriating the benefits of the investments of competitors.
Third concern relates to agreements between Google and partners on the websites of which Google delivers search advertisements.
The fourth concern relates to restrictions that Google puts to the portability of online search advertising campaigns from its platform AdWords to the platforms of competitors. The concern is that Google imposes contractual restrictions on software developers which prevent them from offering tools that allow the seamless transfer of search advertising campaigns across AdWords and other platforms for search advertising.
On a related note, notice that the statement is conciliatory in nature, which Joaquín Almunia himself stating, and to quote
“I offer Google the possibility to come up in a matter of weeks with first proposals of remedies to address each of these points.”
This is not a new phenomenon in competition investigations and it it is one which the CCI itself should begin to adopt. It saves time and prevents unnecessary and lengthy litigation. The logic in this case (though it may differ on the circumstances of each case) is that despite their their potential anti-competitiveness, it must be universally accepted that Google products are in general extremely beneficial to its users, and thus any changes forced upon Google, while they may or may not ensure a competitive marlet, shall in all probability harm consumer welfare till a certain extent. (This is one of the issues underlined by Robert Bork in his competition law classic The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War with Itself. A must read for all those with a special focus of interest in competition law.)